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DROWNED OUT WITHOUT DISCOVERY:
POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURAL INADEQUACY INAN ERA
OF HABEAS DEFERENCE
by Rachel G. Cohen & KristaA. Dolan

St(t, post-conviction proceedings are
beeininI the central stage upon which the
batle fo 1eedom
f
from imprisonment, for life
versus death, and for the protection of substantial constitutional rights must be litigated.
An ever-narrowing lens through which federal
review may be conducted, it has rendered the
state court the sole opportunity to adduce evidence in support of a prisoner's claims that he
is being held in violation of the Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the initial-review collateral proceeding in
state court as the critical forum for the vindication of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.' Such claims "often depend on evidence
outside [of] the trial record."2 The Court has
recognized that in federal post-conviction litigation, it is far better to permit litigants to raise
certain claims in collateral proceedings where
there "has been an opportunity to fully develop
the factual predicate for the claim."' In emphasizing the importance of collateral post-conviction review, presentation of evidence on the record, in state court, takes on a pivotal role.

es the need, in light of recent Supreme Court
decisions and federal statute, to expand access
to discovery in the post-conviction context.
Part III discusses the "fast-track" provision of
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act and its failure to address a post-conviction
litigant's access to discovery. Part IV discusses
the need for adequate post-conviction discovery procedures, as well as an overview of existing state law. Part V discusses Kentucky's
Open Records Act and associated issues with
obtaining records via open records procedures.
Finally, Part VI discusses potential options for
implementing a mechanism providing postconviction litigants with meaningful access to
discovery.
I. "Discovery" in Kentucky

Kentucky's rules regarding discovery in
criminal cases are set forth by Kentucky's Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Discovery is not automatic; rather, it must be requested by the defense." Among items that defendants are entitled to, once requested, are: oral incriminating
By contrast, the Commonwealth of Ken- statements by the defendant, written or recordtucky has effectually eviscerated the post-con- ed statements or confessions by the defendant,'
viction litigant's access to a full evaluation of results or reports of physical or mental examithe evidence necessary to vindicate his rights. nations, and scientific tests made in connecThis paper will begin by discussing discovery tion with the case.' Once requested, however,
mechanisms in Kentucky and the existing inad- Kentucky recognizes that the trial judge must
equacies of those mechanisms. Part II discuss- have broad discretion to determine the extent
4
Ky. R. CRIM. P. 7.24.
1
See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012).
5
Id. at (1).
2
Id. at 1318.
6
Id. at (1)(a).
3
Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003).
7
Id. at (1)(b).
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of appropriate disclosure by the parties.8 The
Kentucky Supreme Court has noted that such
discretion is necessary to protect the spirit underlying discovery rules the adversary system
must not become "a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal
their cards until played."9
As it stands, there is no mechanism for
receiving any type of discovery when litigating
post-conviction matters in the Commonwealth
of Kentucky.10 While the trial court has discretion to order access to some files in a limited
context, there is no uniformity throughout the
state. Various permutations outside of statutory
authority exist for providing litigants access to
the materials they require for the post-conviction process. Kentucky contemplates whether a
litigant should have access to the entirety of the
material that was provided to his counsel in advance of trial or the entry of a guilty plea." Indeed, Kentucky has determined that counsel's
file is the sole property of the defendant not
trial counsel. As the Kentucky Supreme Court
8
See Kentucky v. Peters, 353 S.W.3d 592, 596 (Ky.
2011) (noting that the court may make discovery orders as appropriate).
9
Kentucky v. Nichols, 280 S.W.3d 39, 44 (Ky. 2009)
(quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 (1970)).
10
See Bowling v. Kentucky, 357 S.W.3d 462, 466 (Ky.
2010) (noting that "a person already convicted in a fair trial,"
does not have the same liberty interest as someone standing
trial, and thus is not entitled to pre-conviction trial rights).
11
See Hawkins v. Kentucky, No. 2006-CA-00 1859MR, 2007 WL 4355492 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2007) (underscoring the problematic nature of not providing a postconviction litigant with access to all of the materials in trial
counsel's possession at the time of the guilty plea entry).
Hawkins alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for encouraging him to plead guilty without having received discovery
in the case. The Court of Appeals noted, "the parties' Agreed
Discovery Order required the parties to submit discovery
only to each other, and not to the court." Id. at *2. The Court
was thus unaware of what specifically had been provided to
defense counsel at the time of the plea or what material was
still outstanding; the Court determined that because some
discovery had been provided, counsel had not been ineffective.
Absent Hawkins having access to the actual discovery in the
case, however, there was no way for Hawkins to substantiate
his claim that the discovery would have led him to reject the
guilty plea or that counsel failed to adequately follow up on
potential lines of investigation unearthed by the discovery.
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol1/iss1/2
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noted in Hiatt 9. Kentucky, 12 a litigant seeking
the file of his trial counsel is only seeking "that

which is his in the first place his file."" Thus,
Kentucky precedent establishes that a litigant
should have, and is entitled to, everything his
counsel had. But what happens if counsel's
file is lost? What if a litigant had initial and
successor counsel, each of whom was provided
portions of the discovery by the prosecution
at different phases prior to trial?14 There is no
guarantee that a post-conviction litigant will
have access to "his file" as kept by trial counsel. 5
Further, though the requested records
would presumably be part of the trial attorneys
file, if claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
are brought, it is nonsensical to expect a litigant

to rely on the records collected by the very attorney against whom he claims ineffectiveness,
including claims that counsel failed to conduct
adequate investigation. In fact, the system often pushes clients to plea deals long before adequate investigation can be conducted.
The underfunding and understaffing of indigent defense systems, for
example, places substantial pressure
on counsel for indigent defendants
to do what they can with what they
have available . . . Both prosecutors
and defense counsel are frequently
pushed toward resolving a case at the
12
194 S.W.3d 324 (Ky. 2006).
13
Id. at 327.
14
In 119 of the 120 counties in Kentucky, discovery
is completed outside of the court record. While a prosecutor may notify the court when material is provided to defense
counsel, the material itself is not placed in the court record.
Compare KY R. Jefferson Cir. Ct. Rule 803 (requiring parties
to file discovery responses and materials with the court) with
KY R. Henry, Oldham and Trimble Dist. Ct. Rule IV (providing for informal "open file" discovery) and KY R. Greenup
and Lewis Dist. Ct. Rule VII (providing only that motions for
discovery need be filed with the court)
15
Additionally, an unpublished case from the Kentucky
Court of Appeals indicates that there is no jurisdiction to compel trial counsel to turn over their file to a defendant before a
post-conviction petition is filed alleging ineffective assistance
of counsel. See Garcia v. Howard, No. 2010-CA-000999MR, 2012 WL 246264 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2012). Thus,
a litigant must know what the shortcomings of counsel were
without having access to the discovery in the case.
2
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earliest opportunity.While efficiency
in resolving pending cases has benefits for both the accused and the
State, the process frequently ignores
whether the disposition of a case accurately reflects the accused's degree
of culpability or the deservedness of
the penalty ... Insufficient discovery

contributes to both wrongful convictions and unfair sentencing.

The irony of this arrangement is that Kentucky
provides the prosecutor with access to the bulk
of the materials he will require to defend his
conviction.

Kentucky has implied that the

attorney-client privilege is waived by the filing of a post-conviction motion" and has affirmed the trial court's decision to provide the

A

a claim with specificity as the rule would appear to require. 21 Along these same lines, motions requesting funds for expert assistance in
post-conviction are required to be filed in open
court, 22 eliminating the ex parte strategic and
privacy protections usually granted to indigent
litigants seeking such funds.
II. The Adequacy of State Procedures:
Pinholster
The ability to adduce information in the
record in state post-conviction proceedings has
never been more critical. In 1996, with the pas-

sage of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death
PenaltyAct ("AEDPA"), the United States codified a series of laws designed to limit a state
post-conviction litigant's access to federal habeas review. Federal habeas relief was only accessible to a state petitioner where a violation of
the United States Constitution was proven, and
where the state court's determination on the

prosecution with a copy of the post-conviction
litigant's trial attorney file, in order that he may
respond to the litigant's claims." This inequity exists despite the fact that the defendant
bears the burden of proof in post-conviction
matter was either "contrary to ... or an unrealitigation.1 9 Similarly, a wealth of cases require sonable application of, clearly established Fedthe petitioner to provide affidavits of prof- eral law,as determined
by the Supreme Court of
fered witnesses in the filing of the post-conviction motion,2 0 rather than merely pleading
16
See Mary Prosser, Reforming CriminalDiscovery:
Why Old Objections Must Yield to New Realities, 2006 Wis. L.
REV. 541, 552-53 (2006).

17
While a line of Kentucky cases indicate that attorney-client privilege is waived with the litigation of a post-conviction motion, the American Bar Association's more recent
ethical opinions have created some doubt as to when in the
post-conviction process such a waiver occurs. Compare Gall
v. Kentucky, 702 S.W.2d 37, 44-5 (Ky. 1985) (articulating that
when the attorney's competence is questioned the attorney-client privilege is waived), with ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1
Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-456 (2010) (describing how the
attorney-client privilege is not completely waived but there are
some limitations).
18
Sanborn v. Kentucky, 975 S.W.2d 905, 910 (Ky.
1998).

WL 2059429, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. July 17, 2009) (faulting the
defendant for failing to provide affidavits of the expert with
the filing of his post-conviction motion); Finley v. Kentucky,
No. 2006-CA-002015-MR, 2007 WL 4465579, at *2 (Ky. Ct.
App. Dec. 21, 2007) (finding the petitioner was not entitled to
a hearing because he failed to provide affidavits of uncalled
witnesses); Roland v. Kentucky, No. 2004-CA-001461-MR,
2005 WL 1703300, at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. July 22, 2005) (find-

ing the petitioner not entitled to a hearing because he had not

provided the affidavit of uncalled witness).
21
See Ky. R. CRIM. P. 11.42(2) (requiring only that
a motion for post-conviction relief "state specifically the
grounds on which the sentence is being challenged and the
facts on which the movant relies in support of such grounds").
22
Compare Stopher v. Conliffe, 170 S.W.3d 307, 310
(Ky. 2005) (deeming KRS 31.185, which provides for expert
19
See Dortonv. Kentucky, 433 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Ky.
funding and exparte filing, to be inapplicable to post-convic1968) (stating the movant has the "burden ... to establish
tion proceedings), with Hodge v. Coleman, 244 S.W.3d 102,
convincingly that he was deprived of some substantial right
105-08 (Ky. 2008) (finding that at least some portions of the
which would justify the extraordinary relief afforded by the
KRS 31.185 funding provisions are applicable in the postpost-conviction proceedings").
conviction context). Thus, Stopher and Hodge leave unsettled
20
See, e.g., Blevens v. Kentucky, No. 2010-CAthe question of whether post-conviction litigants may request
001890-MR, 2012 WL 592291, at *4 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 24,
funds exparte, subjecting a litigant to the Hobson's choice
2012) (finding that although the litigant stated the content
of determining whether to one, file the motion ex parte with
of an uncalled witness' testimony, he was not entitled to a
the risk that a judge may unseal such a motion finding it was
hearing as he failed to file an affidavit from that witness); see
improperly filed; or two disclose the particularized need for
also Rankin v. Kentucky, No. 2008-CA-000494-MR, 2009
expert assistance on a particular issue to the opposing party.
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013
Fall 2013
Washington College of Law
7

3

Criminal Law Practitioner, Vol. 1 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 2

Criminal Law Practitioner
the United States, "23 or where the state's ruling
was based on an "unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding." 24 This statute
placed a burden on the petitioner to rebut the
presumption of correctness of factual determinations by the state court based on "clear and
convincing evidence." 2 5 Similarly, AEDPA severely curtailed a habeas petitioner's right to
an evidentiary hearing in federal court. 26 The
statute required litigants to fully exhaust their
claims in state court before proceeding to federal habeas review,27 and generally limited state
petitioners to one federal habeas proceeding,
absent some limited exceptions.2 8 Overall the
message ofAEDPA was clear: expedite the federal habeas corpus review process by deferring
to state court determinations the validity of a
conviction. However, in enacting AEDPA, President Clinton cautioned against criticisms that
the bill "would undercut meaningful Federal
habeas corpus review," instead entrusting federal courts to "interpret AEDPA] to preserve
independent review of Federal legal claims and
the bedrock constitutional principle of an independent judiciary."29

in a landmark habeas case that originated in
California.30 In Cullen v. Pinholster," the Court
examined a federal habeas petition where the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had granted
relief based upon evidence adduced during an
evidentiary hearing in the federal district court.
The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision
finding that it could only consider the evidence
adduced in the state court, and that habeas review under 28 U.S.C. §2254(d) was "limited to
the record that was before the state court that
adjudicated the claim on the merits." 2 The
Court reached this conclusion by noting the

AEDPA's overall purpose:
to channel prisoners' claims first to
the state courts ... It would be con-

trary to that purpose to allow a petitioner to overcome an adverse statecourt decision with new evidence
introduced in a federal habeas court
and reviewed by that court in the
first instance effectively de novo.3 3
Thus, following Pinholster, a state petitioner
bears the burden of adducing every piece of

evidence on the state court record to protect
his rights in federal court.

The overall message of AEDPA was for
federal courts to defer to the state court's determination of a petitioner's rights. In 2011, the
United States Supreme Court further defined
the extent to which deference would operate
§ 2254(d)(1) (2006).

23

28 U.S.C.

24
25
26

Id. § 2254(d)(2).
Id. § 2254(e)(1).
See id. §2254(e)(2) (permitting evidentiary hearings

in federal court for state litigants where the facts were not developed in state court, only where claims rely on "a new rule
of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or a factual predicate that could not have been previously
discovered through the exercise of due diligence." In seeking
an evidentiary hearing, the state litigant in federal court must
also demonstrate that "the facts underlying the claim would be
sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would
have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense").
27
Id. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
28
See id. § 2244(b) (discussing the circumstances
when additional habeas petitions can be filed).
29
President Statement on Antiterrorism Bill Signing
4/24/96, 1996 WL 203049 (The White House) at *2.
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol1/iss1/2
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However, Pinholster left

a

gateway

through which state petitioners could continue
to adduce new evidence in federal court. In
citing to Williams 9. Taylor,34 the PinholsterCourt
noted that this was not a case in the same procedural posture confronted by the Williams case,
where the petitioner was prevented from presenting evidence in state court and was therefore entitled to an evidentiary hearing under
28 U.S.C. 42254(e)(2).

Remaining open is the

30
Just three months earlier, the Supreme Court decided
Harringtonv. Richter, which similarly echoed the notion of
uncanny deference to the state court adjudication, determining
that where a state post-conviction petition appeared to have
been adjudicated on the merits, the federal court would presume that the ruling was reasonable, absent a demonstration to
the contrary. 131 S. Ct. 770, 784-85 (2011).

31
32

131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).
Id. at 1398.

33

Id. at 1398-99.

34

529 U.S. 420 (2000).

35

Pinholster,131 S. Ct. at 1399-1400 (citing Wil-

liams, 529 U.S. at 429) (stating "only one claim at issue in
4
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question as to whether a litigant can present
new evidence where the state court prevented
him from litigating his claims. This loophole
has been applied in federal habeas review to
permit the adducing of evidence in federal
court that was not presented to the state court.
In Smith . Cain," the Federal Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit examined a claim for habeas relief based on a violation under Batson .
Kentucky," where the prosecutor's race-neutral
reasons for the exercise of his peremptory challenges did not appear on the state court record.
The court recognized that the state's failure to
consider evidence amounted to a due process
violation such that the petitioner met the burden required for relief under §2254(d)(1), in
that the state's adjudication on the merits was
"an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal Law."" The Ninth Circuit has
also found that the bar to consideration of new
evidence under Pinholster may be lifted where
the state court has failed to consider the "sideby-side comparisons of [the] black venire panelists and the white panelists who were allowed
to serve," as required under Batson." The Fifth
Circuit has applied the same exception to the
Pinholster ban on new evidence when a petitioner was denied a hearing in state court on
his claim that he was exempted from the death
penalty under Atkins . Virginia.404, 1 Thus, consideration of evidence by a federal court that
was not adduced in the state court may be permitted wherever the petitioner "diligently tried
to develop the facts ... in state court," such that,

[t] here was nothing else [the petitioner] could
have done to develop the factual record."4 2 A
that case was even subject to §2254(d); the rest had not been

adjudicated on the merits in the state-court proceedings); see
Williams, 529 U.S. at 429, 120 S. Ct. 1479 ("Petitioner did not
develop or raise, his claims ... until he filed his federal habeas

"state court's refusal to allow [the petitioner]
to develop the record, combined with the material nature of the evidence that would have
been produced in state court were appropriate
procedures followed, render[s] its decision unbefitting of classification as an adjudication on
the merits."
Indeed, in post-Pinholster litigation,
federal courts have found that the Supreme
Court's ruling was silent on the inherent conflict between federal discovery provisions made
applicable in habeas proceedings, and the limitations on the consideration of new evidence
outlined by the Pinholster decision. As the
United States District Court for the District of
Nevada noted, "the Supreme Court made no
holding in Pinholster as to whether a district
court may grant leave for discovery before it
determines whether § 2254(d)(1) has been satisfied on the merits." 4 4 Thus, courts have found
that:

[D]iscretion is better exercised in not
foreclosing at this stage the possibility of discovery. Were the Court to
permit discovery only after it appears
that Pinholsterwould not bar consideration of new evidence, the Court
would be adding months of delay to
the proceedings, a result that could
be avoided by simply permitting discovery that otherwise appears to be
warranted under Rule 6. The Court
recognizes the downside of its position namely the possibility that

time and money will be expended in
the discovery of evidence that this

Court might never consider. That is
a risk the Court is willing to take. In
a death penalty habeas corpus case,

petition.").

43
Winston v. Pearson, 683 F.3d 489, 502 (4th Cir.
2012); see Richardsonv. Branker, 668 F.3d 128, 152 n. 26
37
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
(4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing with
38
Smith, 708 F.3d at 634 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)
approval the holding in Winston that the state court did not adjudicate the petitioner's claims on the merits because "Virginia
(1)).
39
Jamerson v. Runnels, 713 F.3d 1218, 1226 (9th Cir.
state courts did not afford Winston an evidentiary hearing and
2013) (quoting Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005)). thus passed on the opportunity to adjudicate [his] claim on a
40
Blue v. Thaler, 665 F3d 647 (5th Cir. 2011).
complete record").
41
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
44
High v. Nevens, No. 2:11-CV-00891-MMD-VCF,
42
Toliver v. Pollard, 688 F.3d 853, 860 (7th Cir. 2012).
2013 WL 1292694, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 29, 2013).
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013
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the Court prefers to err on the side
of gathering too much information
rather than too little.4 5

States Supreme Court decided two cases that
appeared to breathe life back into federal habeas law. Cory Maples, an inmate on Alabama's
death row, was represented in his state postOnce a petitioner arrives in federal court, asconviction proceedings by two pro bono attorsuming he has diligently sought discovery in a
neys from a law firm in New York, with an attorstate post-conviction proceeding and has had
ney in Alabama serving solely to assist private
the wherewithal to raise claims and exhaust
counsel in their pro hac vice admission to the
them in state court based on what discovery
Alabama court system.o By the time the state
might show were he able to receive it, a peticourt denied Mr. Maples' petition, his pro bono
tioner may have access to discovery under the
counsel had left their firm, and the mailed defederal rules. The federal rules permit discovnial was returned to the court. "' The clerk of
ery where the litigant can demonstrate "good
court did nothing, nor did Mr. Maples' local
cause" for conducting such discovery. Good
counsel.5 2 When the prosecutor finally notified
cause requires a demonstration that if the facts
Mr. Maples that his claims had been denied, he
are fully developed, the petitioner may be able
was out of time to file an appeal in state court.5 3
to demonstrate his entitlement to relief.4 6
Finality has had its limits, however. Prior
to the enactment of AEDPA, the United States
Supreme Court recognized the importance of
excusing a state court's exercise of procedural
default in order to permit a litigant to proceed
in federal habeas review.47 A petitioner whose
claims have been rejected on adequate and independent procedural grounds may bring his
claims in federal court where he can demonstrate both cause for the default and prejudice
resulting from the denial of his ability to litigate.48 However, the Court rejected the notion
that post-conviction counsel's failure to file a
timely appeal could constitute cause for a procedural default, ruling instead that ineffective
assistance of counsel could amount to cause
only if it was akin to a constitutional violation.
As the noose of AEDPA tightened, however, the Supreme Court became more concerned with the increased likelihood that petitioners would be wholly unable to vindicate

their rights. Just two months apart, the United
45

Conway v. Houk, No. 2:07-CV-947, 2011 WL

2119373, at *4 (S.D. Ohio May 26, 2011).

46
47

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969).
See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 747

(1991).
48

See id. at 750 (reiterating that it must be shown that

justice will be diverted if the claims are not considered in
federal court).
49
Id. at 755.
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol1/iss1/2
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The habeas court thereafter denied Mr. Maples'
claims, stating that they were procedurally defaulted for his failure to exhaust the claims in
state court.5 4 In finding that Maples had shown
sufficient cause to excuse his default under
Coleman 9. Thompson,"" the Court moved away

from the holding in Holland 9. Florida," which
did not excuse the procedural default on the
basis of equitable tolling where the failure to
timely file a pleading was the result of attorney negligence." Instead, the Maples decision
aligned itself with the concurring opinion in

Holland, written by Justice Alito, in which he
found that the procedural default should be excused because the petitioner had been utterly
50
Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 916 (2012).
51
Id. at 916-17.
52
Id. at 917.
53
Id. at 920.
54
Id. at 921 (noting that Maples forfeited his ineffective assistance claim by failing to file the claim in state court
within the requisite time period).
55
501 U.S. 722 (1991) (barring prisoners who defaulted on their federal claims in state court from federal habeas
review unless they can show adequate cause for the default
and prejudice as a result of the claimed federal law violation).
56
See 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010).
57
See id. at 2562-64 (suggesting that while ordinary
attorney negligence does not warrant equitable tolling, the
circumstances of cases which do qualify are not limited to the
Eleventh Circuit's rigid ruling that gross negligence without proof of "bad faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty, mental
impairment or so forth on the lawyer's part" is insufficient for

equitable tolling).
6
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abandoned by his counsel." When Alito had
authored his concurrence just two years earlier,
however, not a single other member of the Supreme Court joined in the opinion."9
Finally, in 2012, the Supreme Court redefined the holding of Coleman, determining
that ineffective assistance of counsel in the first
post-conviction state proceeding could excuse
the procedural default of a petitioner's claims
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel." In
reaching this decision, the Court was chiefly
concerned with the idea that deference to the
state adjudication would result in a complete
loss of a petitioner's ability to vindicate his
rights." This holding was similarly expanded
to states where ineffective assistance of counsel
claims are not required by statute to be brought
in a collateral review process, but where, for
procedural reasons, it is virtually impossible
to raise such claims on direct appeal. 2 In expanding its holding to include post-conviction
matters originating from such states, the Court
noted that the overall importance of the holding of Martinez was the underlying inquiry of
whether the state "affords meaningful review of
a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel" during direct appeal. 3
III. And Along Comes Chapter 154
As a provision ofAEDPA in 1996, the stat58

See laples, 132 S. Ct. at 923-24 (Alito, J., concur-

ring in part and concurring in judgment) (referencing Holland,
130 S. Ct. at 2567-68).
59
See Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2566 (arguing that while

he agrees with the majority's decision, it does not do enough
to set forth what "extraordinary circumstances" in cases involving attorney misconduct qualify for equitable tolling).
60

See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012)

(acknowledging that without adequate counsel, state proceedings may have been insufficient in ensuring that a substantial
claim was given sufficient weight).
61
Id. at 1316 (noting that "[w]hen an attorney errs in
initial-review collateral proceedings, it is likely that no state
court at any level will hear the prisoner's claim").
62
See, e.g., Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 192021 (2013) (discussing the Texas courts' inability to provide

the majority of defendants with an opportunity to bring forth
claims regarding ineffective counsel on direct appeal).

A

ute included a "fast track" provision6 4 whereby
habeas petitions in federal court would be resolved in an expedited fashion upon a showing
that the state court procedure was adequate. 5
The statute required an inquiry into the state
statutory scheme:
This chapter is applicable if a State
establishes .. . a mechanism for the

appointment, compensation,
and
payment of reasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel in
State post- conviction proceedings
brought by indigent prisoners whose
capital convictions and sentences
have been upheld on direct appeal
to the court of last resort in the State

or have otherwise become final for
State law purposes. The rule of court
or statute must provide standards of
competency for the appointment of
such counsel.
State attorney generals, representing the wardens, have petitioned federal courts to apply
the expedited procedures of Chapter 154 in
particular habeas proceedings, alleging that
counsel, as provided, met the competency
and compensation requirements outlined in
§2261.67 In both Spears v. Stewart"' and Ashmus
. Woodford, 9 the federal courts declined to apply the expedited provisions of Chapter 154
upon a finding that counsel was not promptly
64
The "fast track" provisions would require that a
capital post-conviction litigant file his federal habeas petition
within 180 days of the denial of his state petition for relief,
and eliminates any tolling of this statute of limitations by
the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United
States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2263 (1996). Furthermore, these provisions require the district court to complete
review of such a petition within the lesser of 450 days of filing, or 60 days after the matter's submission for a decision. 28
U.S.C. § 2266(b)(1)(A) (2006).
65
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2261(b) (2006).
66

Id.

67
No federal court has ever found a state post-conviction litigant to have adequate state representation such that his
case could be litigated under the "fast track" provision. E.g.
Editorial, "Congress must rewrite the law governing lawyers
for poor death-row inmates," Washington Post, June 21, 2010.

68
283 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2002).
63
Id. at 1919 (emphasis added).
69
202 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2000).
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appointed as required by the opt-in provision.70
In Ashmus, the Ninth Circuit rejected California's appointment mechanism as complying
with the competency requirement of Chapter
154 because the state statutory scheme did not
have mandatory guidelines for the appointment and qualifications of counsel.
On the
other hand, in Spears, the Ninth Circuit found
that Arizona's system provided sufficient guidelines to ensure adequate representation in that
both statutes and procedural rules monitored
attorney competence and compensation, as
well as reasonable litigation expenses; however,
the Ninth Circuit noted that in the petitioner's
case, counsel had not been timely appointed as

required by §2261.72
In 2006, with the enactment of the USA
Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act,
Chapter 154 was amended to allow for the precertification of particular state capital postconviction mechanisms. Under this scheme,
the Attorney General was required to promulgate regulations to implement a certification
procedure for establishing whether a state "has
established a mechanism for the appointment,
compensation, and payment of reasonable
litigation expenses of competent counsel in
State post-conviction proceedings brought by
indigent prisoners who have been sentenced
70

See Spears, 283 F.3d at 992 (9th Cir. 2002) (ruling

because the State of Arizona failed to meet with the timeliness
requirement of Chapter 154 of the AEDPA with regards to the
counsel it appointed for the petitioner, it was not entitled to
any expedited procedures with regards to his case); Ashmus,
202 F.3d at 1160 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding the State of California failed to meet the criteria necessary to qualify for Chapter
154 of the AEDPA with regards to capital prisoner's habeas
petition).
71

See Ashmus, 202 F.3d at 1165-67 (rejecting Califor-

nia's claim that State mechanisms in place from 1989 to 1998
for the appointment of collateral counsel met Chapter 154
requirements).
72

See Spears, 283 F.3d at 1010-11, 1013, 1015, 1019

(noting Arizona's statutes which require that counsel have five
years litigation experience including criminal litigation experience, post-conviction and appellate litigation experience; and
provide for counsel's compensation at $100 an hour and the
provision of "reasonable fees and costs" complied with the requirements of §2261, but finding that because counsel was not
appointed until 18 months after certiorari was denied, Arizona
could not apply Chapter 154).
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol1/iss1/2
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to death."" The statute provides a "quid pro
quo arrangement under which states are accorded stronger finality rules on federal habeas
review in return for strengthening the right
to counsel for indigent capital defendants." 14
However, Chapter 154, both following its initial enactment in 1996, and its amendment in
2006, contains provisions only governing the
competency and compensation of counsel and
the payment of litigation expenses. The rule
does not contain provisions (nor does it permit
regulation)" governing a litigant's access to any
type of discovery in the state post-conviction
process. But should it? Once a post-conviction litigant arrives in federal court, discovery
is available where he can demonstrate "good
cause" before a magistrate judge." Similarly, a
federal court of appeals may review the granting or denial of discovery under an abuse of
discretion standard." Where the district court
orders the expansion of the record through
discovery, it may then consider whether to
grant an evidentiary hearing in light of the
newly adduced evidence." However, under the
expedited procedures, a habeas petition must
be filed within 180 days of the affirmance of
the conviction by the state court.'9 This small
73

74

28 U.S.C. § 2265(a)(1)(A) (2006).
Ashmus v. Calderon, 935 F. Supp. 1048, 1056 (N.D.

Cal. 1996), rev'd, 148 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 1998).

75
Chapter 154 does not permit the Attorney General
to outline regulations governing any other aspect of a state's
post-conviction mechanism beyond the competency and compensation of counsel and the payment of litigation expenses.
28 U.S.C. § 2265(a)(3) (2006) ("There are no requirements for
certification or for application of this chapter other than those
expressly stated in this chapter.").
76

See, e.g., Hayes v. Woodford, 301 F.3d 1054, 1065

n.6 (9th Cir. 2002); Holley v. Smith, 792 F.2d 1046, 1049
(11th Cir. 1986) (explaining that upon arriving in federal court,
the burden is on the petitioner to establish that an evidentiary
hearing is necessary).
77
See Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 728 (9th
Cir. 2003) (reiterating that in habeas proceedings there is no
federal right to discovery, its dispensation and scope are left
entirely to the judge's discretion).
78

See Valverde v. Stinson 224 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir.

2000) (discussing some of the discretionary powers available
to the district court with regards to evidentiary hearings).
79
See 28 U.S.C. § 2263(a), (b)(3) (2006) (the statute of
limitations will be tolled for any time that the petition is properly filed seeking a grant of certiorari from the United States
8
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window of time renders the possibility of adequate discovery prior to filing a habeas petition
a defacto nullity, granting litigants only seven
months to request, litigate, receive, review, and
plead claims related to post-conviction discovery. Nor does the fact that a petitioner could
attempt to seek discovery and amend his petition after filing adequately protect federal habeas rights. The Court must decide a habeas
petition under the expedited procedures on
the earlier of 450 days from the filing of the initial petition, or sixty days after the submission
of the matter.80 Assuming the petitioner could
be granted discovery and subsequently amend
his petition in light of heretofore unknown information, the 450 days would have to be sufficient time to request, litigate, receive, review,
and amend in light of discovery, while also allowing time for the prosecution to respond, all
without hobbling the district court's ability to
hold a hearing, if necessary, and finally adjudicate the matter.
Deference under AEDPA, Pinholster,
and its progeny strikes a balance that states are
capable of being relied upon to adequately adjudicate their own matters and protect a litigant's constitutional rights. Similarly, the entire premise upon which Chapter 154 is based
is that states can provide an adequate post-conviction mechanism. The woeful inadequacy of
post-conviction discovery hamstrings the litigant's ability to vindicate the critical rights at
stake.
But does due process entitle a state habeas petitioner to discovery? While the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

rights are required for this minimal due process in the post-conviction context, the Supreme Court has noted that an assessment
of what is provided in other states effectively
demonstrates what a particular state can be expected to provide.8 2

I. Full Post-Conviction Discovery
Mechanism
Some scholars have noted the importance of post-conviction review at detecting
system errors.8 3 While some may argue that
full access to discovery in post-conviction may
seem duplicative and disruptive of finality, "[t]

he high rates of error found at each stage [of review] ... confirm the need for multiple judicial
inspections."8 4
Full access to discovery in the post-conviction process would provide petitioners with
a far more complete process. This situation

would allow litigants to seek materials that had
not been sought by trial counsel, and were only

available to the prosecution, including criminal backgrounds of witnesses, photographs of
physical evidence, and the entire line of police
reports underlying the state's investigation. A
majority of states provide some access to discovery in their post-conviction proceedings.

California permits a litigant in capital
post-conviction litigation to request discovery
in the state court prior to the filing of a state
habeas petition. Their statutory scheme permits state habeas litigants access to discovery

materials where the petitioner is serving a life
The state
sentence or awaiting execution.'

affords post-conviction litigants minimal pro-

stantive right).

tections, it does require that the state provide
adequate, effective and meaningful procedures
that allow a litigant to "vindicate the substantive rights provided." 1 In determining what

82

Supreme Court or state post-conviction relief; the district court
may grant one thirty (30) day continuance for "good cause").
80
See 28 U.S.C. § 2266(b)(1)(A) (2006).
81
See Dist. Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial
Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 69 (2009) (explaining that a

See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 410-11 (1993)

(assessing what procedures were provided in a majority of
states to determine whether a particular state's post-conviction
process violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
83
See James S. Liebman, et. al., CapitalAttrition: ErrorRates in Capital Cases 1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1839,

1848 (2000) (noting that error, in at least some states, is often
caught in post-conviction review; in Maryland, state post-conviction led to at least 52% of the capital judgments that were
reviewed being overturned "due to serious error").

federal court is entitled to skirt a state's post-conviction relief
procedures only if the procedures are unable to uphold a sub-

84
Id. at 1855-56.
85
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.9 (West 2003).
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permits such discovery upon a showing that
good faith efforts to obtain discovery materials from trial counsel were made and were
unsuccessful,"" and limits the defendant's access to materials that are solely "in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement
authorities to which the same defendant would

have been entitled at the time of trial."" In interpreting its statute, California has noted that
the rationale behind the rule is to enable defendants to have full access to discovery "as an
aid in preparing the petition.""

Furthermore,

California does not limit the application of the
rule to materials that were actually requested
by the defense and turned over by the prosecution; instead, a defendant is entitled to materials the defense "should have possessed.""
California's policy provides a state habeas pe-

In an attempt to balance the finality of a
conviction and fairness to the post-conviction
litigant, a majority of states permit limited postconviction discovery. In those contexts, the
courts may consider the need for the discovery in a particular case, as well as the burden
that the granting of such discovery would place
upon the prosecution. In considering whether
to grant post-conviction discovery, Florida expressly outlines that the trial court must evaluate "the issues presented, the elapsed time between the conviction and the post-conviction
hearing, any burdens placed on the opposing
party and witnesses, alternative means of securing the evidence, and any other relevant
facts."94

Similarly,WestVirginia, Idaho, and Colorado
permit
a post-conviction litigant access to
titioner "specific discovery that the prosecutor
did provide but has become lost to petitioner, discovery where such a request is feasible and
that the prosecution should have provided but practicable. West Virginia outlines this stanfailed to do so, and to which the defense would dard as permitting discovery where, "a court in
the exercise of its discretion determines that
have been entitled had it requested it."90
such process would assist in resolving a factual
Additionally, New Mexico has deter- dispute that, if resolved in the petitioner's famined that as state habeas proceedings are vor, would entitle him or her to relief."" Idapart and parcel of a defendant's criminal con- ho's slightly more restrictive rule indicates that
viction, those rules governing criminal pre-trial discovery is not required in the post-conviction
discovery are similarly applicable.9 ' Nebraska process and that the trial court has sole disalso makes the pre-trial discovery rules appli- cretion to determine to what extent discovery
cable in the post-conviction process, but con- should be granted.9" However, the judge abustemplates that such motions for discovery are es his discretion where the post-conviction litionly permissible after a state habeas petition gant can demonstrate that the denial of access
has been filed.92 Wyoming and South Dakota to discovery was erroneous, as such discovery
permit discovery in accordance with their civil was "necessary to protect an applicant's subrules of procedure.93
86
Id. § 1054.9(a).
87
Id. §1054.9(b).
88
In re Steele, 85 P.3d 444, 449 (Cal. 2004).
89
Id. at 450 (emphasis in original).
90
Id. at 449.
91
See Allen v. LeMaster, 267 P.3d 806, 811 (N.M.
2011) (examining whether the defendant can be compelled to
produce a statement in post-conviction proceedings based on
pre-trial discovery principles).
92
See State v. El-Tabech, 610 N.W.2d 737, 744 (Neb.
2000) (commenting that there must be a proceeding pending
to make a discovery request as discovery relates to specific
proceedings).
93
See Jenner v. Dooley, 590 N.W.2d 463, 469 (S.D.
1999); Wyoming ex rel. Hopkinson v. Dist. Court, Teton
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol1/iss1/2
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County, 696 P.2d 54, 72 (Wyo. 1985).

94
Florida v. Lewis, 656 So.2d 1248, 1250 (Fla. 1994);
see also id. (noting that "[i]n most cases any grounds for postconviction relief will appear on the face of the record. On a
motion which sets forth good reason, however, the court may
allow limited discovery into matters which are relevant and
material and where the discovery is permitted the court may
place limitations on the sources and scope. On review of an
order denying or limiting discovery it will be the [moving
party's] burden to show that the discretion has been abused").
95
West Virginia ex rel. Parsons v. Zakaib, 532 S.E.2d
654, 659 (W. Va. 2000).
96
See Merrifield v. Arave, 912 P.2d 674, 678 (Idaho
1996) (finding room to determine "on a case-by-case basis,
whether and to what extent the discovery rules should be followed in pursuing habeas corpus actions").
10
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A

stantial rights."97 Colorado's rights are similarly
limited, but permit a post-conviction petitioner
to access discovery materials where "it is clearly
shown that the matters sought to be discovered
will be relevant to the very narrow issue of a ha-

out access to necessary or relevant evidence,"'0 3
thereafter engaging in a detailed analysis of
whether the petitioner had shown a likelihood
that the undisclosed discovery would substantiate his claims. The Smith court's analysis inbeas corpus hearing."98 Oklahoma's post-con- dicated that where the petitioner can meet the
viction statutes limit discovery to matters that showing that such discovery is necessary, the
could not have been raised on direct appeal trial court has discretion to order the discloand would support a showing of either the rea- sure of such materials and the superior court
sonable probability of a different outcome at will analyze whether the trial court has abused
trial, or that the petitioner is factually innocent; its discretion where it denies discovery.
the petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that his discovery requests are so limited.9 9

Similarly, Wisconsin confronts post-conviction
litigants with the burden of establishing that
the sought material would create a reasonable
probability of a different outcome had it been
utilized at trial, in order to obtain discovery.100
Connecticut similarly curtails the rights
of a post-conviction litigant to access discovery,

but the state firmly vests the trial court with
discretion to make such a determination. 101
However, the Superior Court of Connecticut
has cautioned trial courts that in the exercise of

their discretion, they must consider, "the gravity of the rights at stake," such that a "habeas petitioner should be entitled to obtain evidence
sufficient to explore his claims and present his
case, but there is no carte blanche right for a
petitioner to fish through a state's file in search
of fodder for unspecific and unsupported
claims."102 In Smith 9. Warden, the Connecticut
Superior Court noted that the petitioner had
"zealously and diligently pursued" his claims
and had made good-faith efforts to obtain evidence from the prosecution and other public
agencies. While denying the petitioner's discovery requests, the Connecticut Court noted
that the task of successful post-conviction litigation is rendered all the more difficult, "with97

Id.

98
Hithe v. Nelson, 471 P.2d 596, 598 (Colo. 1970).
99
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1089(c) (2013).
100
See Wisconsin v. Avery, Nos. 2004 AP 1121, 2004
AP 1395, at *9 (Wisc. App. June 20, 2006).
101
Vazquez v. Conun'r of Corr., 17 A.3d 1089, 1099
(Conn. 2011).

While allowing for all other post-conviction discovery requests to be subject to the
sound discretion of the trial court,104 Virginia
requires that a trial court scrutinize discovery
requests in cases where the post-conviction litigant is alleging the withholding of exculpatory
1 05
evidence in violation of Brady . Marland.
Virginia courts have recognized that, "[u]nless
trial judges scrutinize discovery requests in
those instances where a plausible claim is
made that material exculpatory evidence exists, protection of an accused's due process/
Brady rights is left solely in the hands of the
prosecutor."06 The trial judge may thus elect
to conduct an in camera review to search for
material and exculpatory evidence allegedly
contained in the prosecutor's file, or he may order disclosure of the previously withheld document, should the prosecution acknowledge its
existence, while disputing its materiality1 0 ' The
Virginia Court of Appeals noted that there is
no procedure, other than "a mandatory 'open
file' rule, that can ensure defense access to all
material exculpatory information possessed by
the Commonwealth. In order to extend the discovery requirement to that point would require
action by the legislature or an amendment to
the discovery rules by the Supreme Court."1 08
A majority of states permit discovery
where the petitioner makes a showing of good
103

Id. at *2.

104
Yeatts v. Murray, 455 S.E.2d 18, 21 (Va. 1995).
105
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
106
Milton v. Virginia, No. 0637-91-1, 1992 WL 441866,
at *2 (Vir. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 1992).

102
Smithy. Warden, No. CV030004228S, 2009 WL
107
See id.
1057529, at *1 (Conn. Mar. 24, 2009).
108
Id. at *2 n. 1.
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cause. 109

Due to the obvious importance of
the discovery procedures in determining the appropriateness of summary dismissal, the petitioner is entitled to the assistance of counsel if
such methods are utilized.110

Louisiana gives the trial judge wide

discretion to order post-conviction discovery
once a post-conviction litigant has demonstrated "good cause:"
Recognizing the need in some cases
to go beyond the record of the proceedings, the Code of Criminal Procedure now empowers the district
court to authorize oral depositions,
requests for admissions of fact, and
requests for admission of genuine-

ness of documents. Such discovery techniques may be used upon a
showing of "good cause" and are to
be regulated by the court. The court
should be guided by the Louisiana

Code of Civil Procedure in specifying the conditions under which the

discovery techniques are to be used.
Discovery devices may be employed
effectively to eliminate possible factual disputes by fully developing the

petitioner's allegations.

claim (when alleged in the petition)
may collapse after the petitioner's
deposition has been taken and, under oath, he recants some of his allegations.
After the methods of expanding the

record have been employed, the
court may find that no evidentiary
hearing is needed.
109
See Pennsylvania v. Collins, 957 A.2d 237, 272 (Pa.
2008) (finding post-conviction discovery permitted only where
"good cause" shown); see also Canion v. Cole, 115 P.3d 1261,
1262 (Ariz. 2005) (examining whether lower court abused
discretion in finding that petitioner had shown good cause for

granting post-conviction discovery); Kemp v. Mississippi, 904
So. 2d 1137, 1139 (Miss. 2004) (Mississippi Uniform Postconviction Collateral Relief Act provides for discovery where

"good cause is shown and in the discretion of the trial judge");
Exparte Land, 775 So. 2d 847, 852 (Ala. 2000) (finding that

"good cause" is the appropriate standard by which to judge
post-conviction discovery motions); Dawson v. Delaware, 673
A.2d 1186, 1198 (Del. 1996) (affirming trial court's denial
of post-conviction discovery where "good cause" was not
shown); Jensen v. North Dakota, 373 N.W.2d 894, 901 (N.D.
1985) (finding litigant not entitled to post-conviction discovery where he has not met initial burden of showing "good
cause").
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol1/iss1/2
Washington College of Law

V Not-So Open Records

Vhat ap-

pears to be a factually meritonious
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Nevada supplants this "good cause" standard
with civil procedure rules for discovery in postGeorgia and Ohio
conviction proceedings.'
give trial court judges discretion to grant discovery in post-conviction proceedings. 1 12 Texas
authorizes the trial judge to "utilize affidavits,
depositions, interrogatories, personal recollections, and evidentiary hearings," to resolve
contested issues in a petition for post-conviction relief." Under such an analysis, the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
would require Kentucky to provide some access to discovery mechanisms in the post-conviction process.

Fall 2013

The limited mechanism Kentucky purports to provide to the general public (and
thereby post-conviction litigants) has been
hobbled by the language and nonsensical interpretation of the statute itself. In Kentucky, it
is well established that all public records must
be disclosed, except those falling into one of
the narrowly construed exceptions to the Open
Records Act.1 14
110
Louisiana ex rel. Tassin v. Whitley, 602 So. 2d 721,
723 (La. 1992) (quoting Developments in the law, 1979-1980:
Postconviction procedure. Cheney C. Joseph, Jr., 41 La. L.
Rev. 625 (1981) and LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 929).
111
See NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 34.780(2) (2013) (permitting post-conviction counsel to "invoke any method of
discovery under the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure if, and
to the extent that, the judge or justice for good cause shown
grants leave to do so").
112
See Turpinv. Bennett, 513 S.E.2d 478, 483 (Ga.
1999) (deciding that a trial court's decision regarding discovery will only be reversed when it is clear the trial court abused
its discretion); Ohio v. Wiles, 709 N.E.2d 898, 903 (Ohio Ct.

App. 1998) (reiterating that the trial court decides discovery
issues on post-conviction claims).
113
Ex Parte Patrick, 977 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1998) (Baird, J., concurring).
114
See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 61.871 (LexisNexis
2013).
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The Open Records Act provides for several exemptions, among them, records of law
enforcement agencies:
Records of law enforcement agen-

cies .

.

. that were compiled in the

process of detecting and investigating statutory or regulatory violations
if the disclosure of the information
would harm the agency by revealing
the identity of informants not otherwise known or by premature release of information to be used in a
prospective law enforcement action
or administrative adjudication. Unless exempted by other provisions
.

.

. public records exempted under

this provision shall be open after enforcement action is completed or a
decision is made to take no action;
however, records or information
compiled and maintained by county
attorneys or Commonwealth's attorneys pertaining to criminal investigations or criminal litigation shall be
exempted."'
In Skaggs . Redford,"' a request was made for
the Commonwealth Attorney's file while the
defendant was preparing to file his federal habeas petition."' While the Skaggs court stated
that a federal habeas action was considered a
prospective law enforcement action, it was in
the context of access to the Commonwealth
Attorney's file, not police records."
"[T]he
state's interest in prosecuting the appellant
is not terminated until his sentence has been
carried out. The Office of Commonwealth of

[sic] Attorney . . . represent[s] the state's pros-

ecutorial function in this case."" 9 There is no
mention of records from a police lab in that
case, yet the case has been used repeatedly
to apply the exemption to police investigative
files. Further, Skaggs dealt with the secondary exemption in KRS 61.878(h): the records of
115

Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.

§ 61.878(h) (West 2013) (em-

phasis added).
116

844 S.W.2d 389 (Ky. 1992).

117
118

Id. at 389.
Id. at 390.

A

Commonwealth's attorneys are always exempt.
KRS 61.871 provides that exemptions shall
be strictly construed. The exemption only exists for law enforcement agencies if they can
prove harm. Until recently, the Attorney General's Office, which is responsible for issuing
decisions in Open Records disputes, has continuously extended Skaggs to apply to police
agencies. 12 0 This results in uneven application
of the Open Records Act, as sometimes police
agencies will grant requests for open records
in a post-conviction action, while other times
they will not. The continued denial of access to
police records and lab reports based on existing case law violates defendants' due process
rights and should be clarified to note that the
exemptions apply only to the Commonwealth
Attorney's files and not to police investigative
files.
By contrast in Courier-Journal,Inc. 9.
Lawson, 12 1 the Courier-Journal sought disclosure under the Open Records Act of a proffer
given by Lawson during the entry of a guilty
plea, which was used by the Attorney General to conduct a criminal investigation. When
the Courier-Journal sought disclosure, Lawson
moved to enjoin the Attorney General from
providing the information. On appeal, the
Kentucky Supreme Court noted that Hiatt was
inapplicable to the case because the proffer
was not contained in the file of Lawson's trial
counsel, which would have belonged to Lawson. Because the information was in the possession of the Attorney General, Lawson had
no authority to determine what would happen
to the proffer.12 2 While outside of the criminal
litigation context, the Lawson case draws a significant distinction between material physically
contained in trial counsel's file and material in
the prosecution's file, even if such information
references the same document.

120
See City of Ft. Thomas v. Cincinnati Enquirer, 406
S.W.3d 842 (Ky. 2013) (holding that in order to invoke the law

enforcement exemption of the Open Records Act, the agency
must articulate a factual basis for a showing of harm).

121
307 S.W.3d 617 (Ky. 2010).
Id.
119
122
See id. at 624.
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In addition to denial of police investigative files, police investigative agencies in Kentucky have also used the Open Records Act to
deny access to lab results from DNA analysis
that have previously been completed because
of another exemption in the Open Records Act
that has been misinterpreted. KRS 17.175(4)
provides that "DNA identification records produced from the samples are not public records
but shall be confidential and used only for law
enforcement purposes. DNA identification
records shall be exempt from the provisions
of KRS 61.870 to 61.884." Reliance on this exemption to deny access to already-existing reports is clearly overbroad. The plain language
indicates that the exemption applies only to
DNA from a person, and not to DNA from a
crime scene. KRS 17.169(1) sets forth definitions for KRS 17.175(4); sample means "a blood
or swab specimen from a person." Further,
KRS 17.170 identifies those required to submit samples for inclusion in the database. So,
while KRS 17.175(4) exempts "DNA identification records produced from samples," by definition, only those identification records produced from samples from a person are exempt.
Further, the intent of the statute is expressly
stated within the statute:

Ironically, at the same time, Kentucky has
noted the overall importance of DNA testing
to potential exoneration in the post-conviction
process. Just as Kentucky's statutes contain
no right to discovery in post-conviction, until recently, Kentucky's statutes contained no

The purpose of the centralized DNA
database is to assist federal, state,
and local criminal justice and law
enforcement agencies within and
outside the Commonwealth in the
identification, detection, or exclusion of individuals who are subjects
of the investigation or prosecution
of sex-related crimes, violent cnimes,
or other crimes and the identification and location of missing and unidentified persons. 123

VI. Efficacious Solutions

The purpose is not to prevent a criminal defendant from accessing lab reports produced
in connection with his case. Despite this, the
exemption has been used to deny access to records. 124
123
Ky. REv. STAT. ANm. § 17.175(2) (LexisNexis 2013)
(emphasis added).
124
See, e.g., Ky. Op. Atty. Gen. 03-ORD-126; Ky. Op.
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol1/iss1/2
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provision granting post-conviction litigants ac-

cess to DNA testing in non-capital cases even
in cases where the litigant had the funding to
conduct such testing and was only seeking access to the physical evidence. The Kentucky
Supreme Court noted that the restriction of access to such evidence, which could be "substantial, if not pivotal" to the litigants' motion for a
new trial, amounted to an abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court. 125 In reversing the
trial court's denial of the litigants' DNA testing motion, the court further noted "that evidence admitted into criminal trials in this state
belongs to the Commonwealth of Kentucky. It
does not belong to the Commonwealth's Attorney. The latter is charged with the duty to preserve and protect the integrity of the evidence,
not to hoard it." 126 Thus, in the narrow realm
of DNA testing, Kentucky has recognized that
it is grossly unfair to allow the prosecution to
be the architect of a proceedingl 27 seeking to
maintain a conviction.

Creating statutory authority for the provision of open file discovery would guarantee
that a post-conviction litigant has access to all
Atty. Gen. 13-ORD-038, FN1; Ky. Op. Atty. Gen. 05-ORD251; Ky. Op. Atty. Gen. 10-ORD-188. The Kentucky Legislature recently passed HB 41, which expands Kentucky's DNA
testing statute, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 422.285 (Wests 2013) to
include access to DNA testing, as well as lab results completed
in connection with DNA testing, in non-capital cases. The bill
became effective June 20, 2013. Presumably, this will prevent
agencies from continuing to rely on Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
17.175(4) (West 2009) to deny access.
125
Hardin v. Kentucky, 396 S.W.3d 909, 914 (Ky. 2013)
(quoting Bedingfield v. Kentucky, 260 S.W.3d 805, 815 (Ky.
2008)).
126
Hardin, 396 S.W.3d at 915.
127
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963)
(holding that due process is violated where the prosecution
withholds material exculpatory evidence, as such suppression
"casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding
that does not comport with standards of justice").
14
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for relief specifically and must allege "the facts
on which the movant relies in support of such
grounds.""' The rule further provides that
counsel be appointed only in those cases where
the court grants a hearing. 132 A hearing is required only in those cases where the defendant
has raised facts that, if true, would support the
finding of a violation of the petitioner's constitutional rights.'
Thus, a pro se litigant must
have access to the entire file, including those
materials in possession of the prosecution, in
order to adequately plead his claims. He must
be able to outline for the court specific facts
that supports those claims in order to prove
that he is entitled to a hearing and thereby entitled to counsel. An incarcerated inmate, who
open-file discovery to Kentucky's post-con- is typically the post-conviction litigant, would
viction process would ensure that defendants not be physically able to examine the file in the
could access all of the materials to which their prosecution's possession, nor would he have
trial counsel had access, while not requiring access to facilities to make copies of the necesthe prosecution to undertake the financial bur- sary portions of that file. While subsequently
den of replicating their entire file.
appointed counsel may amend a litigant's petition to include additional meritorious claims,13 4
Kentucky's post-conviction access to reliance upon an open-file discovery proceedcounsel limits the effectiveness of open-file ing would be inadequate to enable a pro se
discovery, which grants carte blanche access litigant to adequately plead a claim sufficient
to examine the prosecution's file, but does not to meet the requirements for appointment of
physically provide copies of the file to a defen- counsel outlined by Rule 11.42.
of the materials provided to trial counsel in
litigating his post-conviction claims. Under
such a procedure, the prosecution would simply make their file (minus privileged thoughts
and impressions work-product) available to a
litigant. By comparing the file of trial counsel,
to which the post-conviction litigant is entitled
under Hiatt,128 a defendant would have access
to the full panoply of materials to determine
what claims he may have. Open file discovery is routinely provided in advance of trial by
prosecutors in certain counties throughout the
Commonwealth of Kentucky,129 and has been
lauded by reformers of the criminal justice
system for its ability to "level the playing field"
and prevent wrongful convictions.13 0 Applying

dant. Kentucky's statute for collateral attack,
Rule 11.42, requires an inmate to file a postconviction petition before being appointed
counsel. The petition must state the grounds
128
194 S.W.3d 324 (Ky. 2006).
129
See, e.g., Porter v. Kentucky, 394 S.W.3d 382, 387
(Ky. 2011) (holding that "parties may agree amongst themselves to provide 'open file' discovery"); see also Hicks v.
Kentucky, 805 S.W.2d 144, 148 (Ky. App. 1990) (noting that
the open file discovery policy adopted by the Commonwealth
in the case "allowed the appellant and his counsel to have full
access to all of the state's evidence relevant to the case").
130
See, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, Brady> Bunch of
Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1533, 1558-59 (2010) (de-

scribing the benefits to both prosecutors and defendants with
open file discovery); see also Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory
Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarmentof Mike
Nifong: The CriticalImportance ofFull Open-File Discovery,
15 GEO. MASON L. REv. 257, 262 (2008) (noting that full dis-

covery would completely satisfy the Constitutional and ethical
requirements); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions:It is
Time to Take ProsecutionDiscipline Seriously, 8 D.C. L. REV.

275, 295 (2004) (articulating that an open discovery system
will help prosecutors to remain ethical).

File recreation would require the prosecution to provide a post-conviction litigant with
every item of discovery that it turned over during trial. The Kentucky Supreme Court in Kentucky 9.Bussell implicitly upheld such access.3
The trial court in Bussell required the prosecution to recreate trial counsel's file for Bussell
by providing his post-conviction counsel the
discovery that had been turned over prior to
trial. When these materials were provided,
post-conviction counsel discovered a wealth of
police reports that indicated the existence of
131
Ky. R. CRIM P. 11.42(2).
132
Id. at 11.42(5).
133
Parrishv. Kentucky, 272 S.W.3d 161, 166 (Ky. 2008)
(quoting Lay v. Kentucky, 506 S.W.2d 507, 508 (Ky. 1974).
134
Civil Rule 15.01, which allows the amendment of an
initial pleading "where justice so requires," has been deemed
applicable to post-conviction litigation under Ky. R. Cr 11.42.
Bowling v. Kentucky, 926 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Ky. 1996).
135
226 S.W.3d 96 (Ky. 2007).
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an alternate suspect, which cumulatively suggested "a reasonable probability that had the
information been disclosed, the outcome of
Bussell's trial would have been different."13 6
After Bussell's conviction was vacated, the
Commonwealth appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in ordering file recreation where
such actions were purportedly prohibited by
the Open Records Act. The Bussel Court declined to address the Commonwealth's claim
that the defense was not entitled to have access
to the exculpatory information for litigating the
post-conviction matter where the Commonwealth had failed to turn over the exculpatory
information prior to trial in violation of Brady.
Implicitly, the Kentucky Supreme Court found
that a trial judge has authority to order such
file recreation subject to the discretion of the
court. Bussel, however, was a results-oriented
decision wherein the Kentucky Supreme Court
examined whether a post-conviction litigant
should have access to the prosecution's file after already knowing that the prosecution had
withheld exculpatory information. The Bussel
Court's silence on the issue of file recreation
severely undermines that there is a requirement that other post-conviction litigants have
access to the same procedure.

ther to guilt or punishment."'
This most often leaves prosecutors with the discretion in
determining what is considered "material," as
"[d]efense lawyers, for all their incentives to
find exculpatory information, usually lack the
'time, resources, or expertise,' to conduct the
type of massive pretrial investigation needed
to ferret out this evidence."" 9 Prosecutors' obligations under Brady are ongoing. 140 Despite
this obligation, which has been in place since
1963, violations of Brady take place regularly.1 4 1
"Studies have pinpointed the suppression of
exculpatory evidence as a factor in many documented wrongful convictions later overturned
by post-conviction DNA testing." 142

A trial judge's determination whether
to provide file recreation is subject to abuse of
discretion review on appeal. Thus, an appellate
court may overturn a trial court's refusal to provide file recreation where such refusal is "arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by
sound legal principles."143 Given the lack of authority requiring the provision of any materials
to a post-conviction litigant, the denial of file
recreation by the trial court is unreviewable.
While this would not resolve all problems underlying the ability to bring meritorious claims
in post-conviction, creating authority for file
The Bussell decision itself serves as a recreation would be an excellent start in allowcautionary tale demonstrating the need for ing apro se post-conviction litigant to plead his
adequate post-conviction discovery. The ma- claims before the state court.
terial upon which Mr. Bussell ultimately received a new trial had not been turned over by
the prosecution prior to, during, or post-trial.
Instead, an unwitting prosecutor, under the
auspices of file recreation, inadvertently turned
it over to post-conviction counsel. Following
vacation of the conviction, the prosecution
attempted to un-ring the bell: to resuppress
138
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
the evidence that had been long-hidden in 139
Medwed, supra note 130, at 1541.
violation of Brady. Such violations are one of 140
Id. at 1537.
Id. at 1539.
the most common errors found at the capital 141
142
Id. at 1540.
ineffecto
post-conviction phase, second only
143
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11
tive assistance of counsel."' While defendants
S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000); see also King v. Kentucky, No.
are entitled to exculpatory evidence, they are 2010-CA-000377-MR, 2011 WL 3516300 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug.
entitled only to evidence that "is material ei- 12, 2011) (applying the abuse of discretion standard to a trial
136
Id. at 102.
137
Liebman, et. al., supra note 83, at 1850.
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol1/iss1/2
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court's ruling concerning the mechanism for providing trial
counsel's file to a post-conviction litigant).
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